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THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLENESS
IN.THE POLICE POWER
By SAMUEL M. SOREF*
I. SCOPE OF THE POLICE POWER
HE magnitude and importance of the police power may be in-
ferred from the following language of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court: "Without it the purpose of civil government could not be at-
tained. It has more to do with the well being of society than any other
power. Properly exercised it is a crowning beneficence. Improperly
exercised it would make of sovereign will a destructive despot, super-
seding and rendering innocuous some of the most cherished principles
of constitutional freedom."'
The exercise of this important branch of our governmental ma-
chinery has become so varied and popular that it has been recognized
as corresponding to the very right of self-preservation, and as form-
ing the basis of our social system. But while the police power has
become an indispensable attribute of sovereign power, and has been
applied to the changing social and economic conditions of different
ages, it has assumed to itself certain characteristics which are not
altogether clear.
It is generally recognized that in the very indefiniteness of the
scope of the police power lies a great deal of its usefulness. And it is
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar.
1 Mehlos v. Milwaakee, 156 Wis. 591; 146 N. W. A82
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when certain boundaries are set out in thR decisions to limit the oper-
ation of the police power that a great deal of confusion has resulted.
It is for that reason, perhaps, of foreseeing the meaninglessness of
limitations that might be placed on the police power that an early
decision refrained from marking out its boundaries. 2
Characterized by indefiniteness, and declared to be as broad as the
general welfare, it is natural that the extent to which the law-making
bodies may encroach upon the rights and property of the individual
in the valid exercise of the police power should always have been
a much controverted question. Private liberty and property rights
have seldom been interferred with without some protest being
offered, even though the large mass of the community actually
profited from the legislation. A vast mass of litigation testifies to that
fact.
For the proper development of this subject, some examples should
be given in which the exercise of the police power has been held
proper. It has been held to be a valid exercise of the police power to
provide for the inspection of illuminating oils in railroad tank cars;'
to permit the flooding of lands in order to create a pond for fish
culture ;4 to prohibit smoking in crowded halls in. order to preserve
pure and fresh air therein;' to forbid the carrying of concealed
weapons;6 to forbid the beating of drums in the streets of a city
without a permit from the mayor;7 to forbid the making of option
contracts to buy or sell grain at a future time ;8 to impose prohibi-
tions upon the time and mode of catching and selling fish and game ;9
to levy an assessment against persons keeping dogs in order to dis-
courage the keeping of those animals ;10 to prohibit a person who is
not a member of a secret society from wearing a badge of such soci-
ety;11 to prescribe the weight and quality of loaves of bread offered
for sale;I2 to limit the height of buildings in order to preserve the
public safety ;13 to create an employees' indemnity fund by assess-
ments upon employers in hazardous callings;14 to require water to
2 Comimonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass) 53.
3 Willis v. Standard Oil Co., 50 Minn. 290.
4 Turner v. Nye, 154 Mass. 579.
5 State v. Heidenhain, 42 La. Ann. 483.
6 Orrick v. Akers, 109 Mo. App. 662.
7 Wilkes-Barre v. Garebed, 9 Kulp. (Pa.) 273.
8 Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425.
9 McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391
10 Wilton v. Weston, 48 Conn. 325.
11 Hammer v. State, 173 Ind. 199.
12 Chicago v. Schmidinger, 243 Ill. 167
13 Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364.
14 State ex r-el. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 66 Wash. 156.
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be furnished on each floor of every tenement house;15 to prescribe
that an assignment by a married man of wages to be earned by him
in future shall be invalid unless consented to by his wife;16 to regu-
late the time and manner in which the right to fish, even on one's
own land, shall be exercised, so as to subserve the common good.'
From this meagre enumeration, one might, perhaps, be led to believe
that almost any kind of a statute could be passed under the guise of
legislating in behalf of the general welfare. But there are various
restrictions.
II. REASONABLENESS AS A LIMITATION ON THE POLICE POWER
An inherent limitation on the police power is "reasonableness."
Property rights cannot be wantonly destroyed by wrongful enact-
ment. There is a limit to the powers which may be exercised by the
State. A reasonable relation must exist between the character of the
legislation and the policy to be subserved. That relationship has been
expressed in various forms. In Ex Parte R. F. Quarg,'8 the court
said, "The police power is broad in its scope, but it is subject to the
just limitation that it extends only to such measures as are reasonable
in their application and which tend in some appreciable degree to pro-
mote, protect, or preserve the public health, morals, or safety, or the
general welfare." An examination of cases dealing wiht state regula-
tion of pulluted water systems discloses the doctrine that "interference
with personal liberty is excusable when reasonably necessary for the
protection of public health, provided the means used and the extent
of the interference are reasonably necessary to accomplish that pur-
pose."'1 In Welch v. Swasey, 0 the court similarly held that statutes
passed in the exercise of the police power should be so tested by the
courts as to see "whether they are reasonably directed to the accom-
plishment of tle purpose on which the constitutional authority rests."
Another court has this to say of the police power: "Police regula-
tions, in order to be valid, must tend to accomplish a legitimate public
purpose; that is, such regulations must have a substantial relation to
the public objects which government may legally accomplish; and,
while it is for the legislative department of a municipality to determine
the occasion for the exercise of its police power, it is clearly within
the jurisdiction of the courts to determine the reasonableness of that
15 Health Dept. of N. Y. v. Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32.
6 Mituatl Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225.
17 State v. Theriault, 70 Vt. 617.
18 149 Cal. 79
19 23 L. R. A. (n.s.) 766.
20 193 Mass. 364.
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exercise.21 The United States Supreme Court in C. B. & Q. Ry. v.
Drainage Cprnnrs.22 declared that if the means employed to promote
the public welfare are "unreasonable," the action of the legislature will
be regarded as illegal.
Evidently, the question of "reasonableness" is of considerable im-
portance in testing the validity of police regulations. In fact, as the
New York Court of Appeals said, "The difference between what is,
and what is not reasonable frequently constitutes the dividing line be-
tween a valid and void enactment of the legislature in the exercise of
its police power. 2' That view is fortified by the words of the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court: "Too much significance cannot be given to the
word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the police power in a
constitutional sense * * * The final evidentiary test of the legitimacy
of a police regulation is whether it is reasonable under all the circum-
stances * * * Every police regulation must answer for its legitimacy
at the bar of reasonableness. 24" Hence there can be no doubt but that
every exercise of the police power is inseparably associated with the
question of reasonableness. It appears further that the examination of
the validity of a police regulation must necessarily involve a study
of the reasonableness and appropriateness of the means employed to
accomplish the public object. If treatment of this subject of reason-
ableness under the police power were to be judged solely by its in-
trinsic importance, such treatment would have to be quite extended
and voluminous. There are indeed numberless decisions which have
dealt with this subject, but to a large extent the courts have merely
given expression to the term "reasonableness," in various ways with-
out giving a definite interpretation of their understanding of this term.
As a result, the language of many cases is highly misleading.
That the application of the doctrine of reasonableness to police reg-
ulations is a matter of no little difficulty may be illustrated by various
conflicting holdings of the courts. In State v. Justus,2 ' the validity of
a statute was involved which required journeymen plumbers to take
an examination and to secure a certificate of competency from a cer-
tain board. The statute was to affect only those engaged in the plumb-
ing business in cities or towns with a population of ten thousand or
more which had a system of sewers or waterworks. The act was de-
clared invalid because "there is no reasonable ground for distinction
in the application of such a law to cities with or without sewer and
water systems," and because "there is no reasonable ground for mak-
21 Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320.
22 200 U. S. 561
23 Health Dept. of N. Y. v. Rector of Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32
24 Mehlos v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591; 146 N. W. 882
290 Minn. 474.
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ing a distinction between what is termed a "master plumber" and
"journeyman plumber." In Illinois and Pennsylvania, however, similar
statutes were held to be reasonable regulations and valid.2"
A conflict arises, too, as to the question of the constitutionality of
statutes known as "Sales in Bulk Acts," passed under the police power.
In Young v. LenieuX,27 a statute, providing that a sale of a retail mer-
chant of the whole or a large part of his stock in trade is voidable at
the instance of creditors unless he has previously recorded a written
notice of his intention to make the sale, was held to be valid exercise
of the police power of the state. The court explained that "It may be
that this act approaches the verge of legislative power, but we cannot
say that its requirements as to the manner and time of giving notice
of the sale are so clearly unreasonable or so unnecessarily burdensome
as to compel us to hold that any constitutional rights have been in-
fringed." The New York Court of Appeals, however, in considering
a similar case, thought such legislation "unreasonable" and therefore
invalid.28
In State v. Boone,29 a statute requiring physicians and midwives
attending at births to investigate and to report as to facts not neces-
sarily or naturally coming within the knowledge of the attending
physician or midwife as to whether the birth is legitimate or illegiti-
mate, the race, birthplace, age and occupation of the father, the race,
birthplace, age, and occupation of the mother was held an invalid exer-
cise of the police power because "unnecessary, unreasonable and arbi-
trary." But in other states, similar statutes were not found to be "un-
reasonable," and were upheld as valid police regulations.30
In People v. Hulbert,3 a riparian owner was convicted of bathing
in the waters of a lake from which a city took its water supply. A
Statute made it a criminal offense to pollute such waters by bathing
or swimming therein. On appeal, the conviction was reversed, the court
holding that "the use made of the water for the purpose of bathing was
a reasonable one and that the conviction could not be sustained under
the' police power of the state. In State v. Morse,32 however, such an
ordinance was held to be a valid exercise of the police power, and
26 Doiuglas v. People, 225 Ill. 536;
Beltz v. Pittsburgh, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 66.
27 79 Conn. 434.
28 Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330.
29 84 Ohio 346.
30 Robinson v. Hamilton, 60 Ia. 134.
Commonwealth v. McConnell, 116 Ky. 358
31 131 Mich. 156.
32 84 \t. 387.
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
therefore, a reasonable use of the water of the pond was not denied to
the riparian owner.
From the foregoing conflicting cases, it is evident that what one
court regards as reasonable another may find to be unreasonable. It
appears, too, that regarded solely as a question of fact, the matter of
reasonableness may be supported either one way or the other. The de-
termination of the validity of a police regulation- is not, however, a
matter of mere discretion or personal judgment; it must seek its solu-
tion in established principles of law and a sound construction of ques-
tions of fact. Just as personal conceptions of right and wrong conduct
are in large part responsible for judicial determinations, so personal
convictions as to what is reasonable and what is unreasonable lead the
court to different interpretations of police regulations. It is impossible,
however, to study these intangible, inarticulate forces which lead one
court to one conclusion and another court to an opposite conclusion.
The study must be confined to definite declarations of the court in its
interpretation of the validity of police regulations. The problem is to
discover what principles are and should be applied by the court in
determining whether a police regulation is reasonable or unreasonable.
Though there is a difference of opinion as to the scope of the police
power, and a recognized difficulty in rendering a satisfactory defini-
tion of it, there seems to be no doubt that generally a police regula-
tion is subject to the test of reasonableness. But what is meant by
"reasonableness ?"
III. UNREASONABLE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL POLICE REGULATIONS
An examination of police regulations which have been held invalid
by the courts is of material assistance in at least partly understanding
the doctrine of reasonableness. A number of cases are referred to in
order to justify some of the statements subsequently set forth.
In People v. Hawkins, 33 it was held by a four to three decision that
a statute forbidding the sale of goods made by convicts without being
marked "Convict-Made" is not a valid exercise of the police power,-
at least as to convict-made goods from other states. The court was of
the opinion that there was not a "reasonable relation" between the
means employed and the object of the legislators, which was to pro-
tect certain workmen in their wages against the competition of other
workmen in penal institutions. Three of the dissenting judges, how-
ever, did not question the reasonableness of the regulation. It may be
added that the majority opinion has been followed, not because the
court was right in finding the regulation unreasonable, but because the
33 157 N. Y. 1.
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statute was in conflict with the commerce clause of the Federal Con-
stitution.
Tolliver v. Blizzard3 4 held that the police power may not be ex-
tended to the prohibition of the sale of certain harmless drinks merely
because certain persons, under the guise of selling such drinks, may
sell intoxicating liquors. The court thought the ordinance unreason-
able," and therefore void.
The court in Maryrnont v. Nevada State Banking Board3 5 held that
a state cannot make it unlawful for any corporation, firm, or individ-
ual to engage in the banking business except through a corporation
duly organized under and complying with certain state laws.
In People v. Gillson,36 a statute was involved which made it a mis-
demeanor for anyone to dispose of any article of food upon any repre-
sentation that anything else than what is the subject of the sale or
exchange is to be delivered as a gift, or reward to the purchaser. The
court, in holding the statute an improper exercise of the police power,
said that this regulation of trade was an "unreasonable and illegal in-
terference with the liberty of the citizen in his pursuit of a livelihood
by engaging in a perfectly valid business, conducted in a perfectly
proper manner."
A municipal ordinance prohibiting the operation of any quarry
within certain prescribed limits, regardless of whether it could be done
without injury to other property of the public, was held to be an in-
valid exercise of the police power for it deprived the owner of his
property without due process of law.3 7
The court in Frank L. Fisher Co. v. Woods38 decided that a statute
making an offer for sale of the real estate of another without written
authority a misdemeanor is an invalid exercise of the police power.
The court said: "To justify the state in interposing its authority in
behalf of the public, it must appear that the interest in the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
such interference, and that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals."
In a Wisconsin case,39 it was held that a statute making it unlawful
for an employer to discharge an employee because he is a member of
a labor organization is an invalid exercise of the police power because
it is violative of the constitutional guarantee of liberty.
34 143 Ky. 773.
35 33 Nev. 333.
36 109 N. Y. 389.
37 Re Kelse, 147 Cal. 609
38 187 N. Y. 990
39 State v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530.
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Bailey v. People40 held a statute restricting the number of persons
that may occupy a room in a lodging house an unsustainable exercise
of the police power because of the discrimination in applying the regu-
lation to lodging house keepers.
Requiring fruit which is packed for shipment to have indicated on
the outside of the container the place where the fruit was grown was
declared an invalid exercise of the police power.
41
Weyther v. Thomas2 held that the police power does not extend to
a statute requiring those engaging in the undertaking business to be
licensed embalmers. The court said, "No argument has been addressed
to us to show that the general embalming of dead bodies is necessary
for the preservation of the public health, and we know of no facts
that indicate such a necessity."
Another court held a law requiring horseshoers to have certain qual-
ifications and to secure a license from a board of examiners after being
examined, to be an improper exercise of the police power.43
Rstricting the right to engage in the insurance brokerage business to
those who made it their principal business and to those who were in
the real estate business was held to be an invalid exercise of the police
power."4 "The legislation now in question," the court said, "must have
been promoted in the interests of those engaged in the insurance brok-
erage business, alone, or in connection with a real estate brokerage
business, rather than with any view of the public welfare."
Ruhstrat v. People45 held that the state police power does not in-
clude the power to prohibit the use of the national flag or emblem for
advertising purposes. The "flag law," the court thouught, was a harm-
less creature which tended in no way to safeguard the interests of
society. It was also declared that the use of the flag for advertising
purposes had "received the unqualified approval of the whole com-
mercial world." Hence the complainant, who was engaged in the
wholesale and retail cigar business, was permitted to use the likeness
of the flag as a label or trademark.
In Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 46 a municipal ordinance was adopted in
August which made it unlawful to erect or maintain gas works in a
certain district. In November, the complainant obtained permission
from the board of fire commissioners to erect gas-works within a priv-
ileged area. Construction was begun. A second ordinance was then
40 190 I1. 28.
41 E, Pare Hayden, 147 Cal. 649
42 200 Mass. 474.
43 Matter v. Aubrey, 36 Wash. 308.
44 Hauser v. North British, Etc. Ins. Co. 206 N. Y. 455.
45 185 Ill. 133.
46 195 U. S. 223.
REASONABLENESS IN THE POLICE POIVER
passed which amended the first ordinance, and included the complain-
ant's premises within the prohibited district. There was no change of
conditions in the district. The ordinance was declared void as an arbi-
trary exercise of the police power.
An ordinance making it unlawful to sell fresh pork or sausage made
thereof between June 1st and and October- 1st was held unreasonable
and void.
4 7
Chicago v. Netcher48 held an ordinance prohibiting the sale of in-
toxicating liquor where dry goods, clothing, jewelry, and hardware are
kept for sale is an invalid exercise of the police power for there is no
"reasonable relation ot the subjects included in such power."
Requiring employers to make weekly payment of wages, notwith-
standing private contracts which they may make with their employees
is not within the police power of the state. "Any law or polcy that
disables the citizen from making a contract whereby he may find law-
ful, needed and satisfactory employment is unreasonable.1 49
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY AS INVOLVED IN THE QUESTION OF
REASONABLENESS
An examination of numerous cases dealing with the police power
discloses a few general principles running through a large percentage
of the cases. Where the test of reasonableness is applied, the test of
constitutional limitations, too, is generally applied. The police power,
of course, depends on the law for its support, and is subject to consti-
tutional restrictions. 0 This governmental power of legislating in behalf
of the public welfare has facetiously been referred to as the power to
pass unconstitutional laws. But an act which is clearly prohibited by
the constitution cannot be valid law, however proper and reasonable
it might be as a police regulation but for such prohibition. 51 The fact
then that a law is reasonable is not in itself sufficient to admit it into
the class of valid laws. If it were the constitution would lose much
of its restraining force, and in many of its applications would be of
no use whatever.. 2 Where the matter of reasonableness must yield to
constitutional restrictions may be illustrated by the case of Ex Parte
Quarg.53 There the court held that an act prohibiting any person from
selling tickets at an advance upon the original purchase price, or the
business of reselling such tickets at a profit, and making it a misde-
47
.Helena v. Dwyer, 64 Ark. 424.
48 183 Ill. 104.
49 Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. State, 160 Ind. 379.
50 State ex rel. Adams v. Burge, 95 Wis. 390.
51 State ex rel. Jones v. Froehlich, 115 Wis. 32.
52 State v. Chittenden, 127 Wis. 468.
53 149 Cal. 79.
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meanor is not a valid exercise of the police power and is void as in-
fringing on the rights of property guaranteed by the constitution and
existing in the individual.
In testing the validity of a police regulation under the constitution,
the statute or ordinance must be assumed to be for a reasonable pur-
pose.54 Whether or not the regulation is reasonable is not to be tested
by its possible application to extreme cases. 55 It should be pondered
whether the framers of the constitution intended that such a power be
exercised in that particular manner, and whether "the spirit of the
Constitution permits such legislation, although a strict construction of
the letter prohibits. '56 In trying to ascertain the object of the enact-
ment, if a result is reached which is so unreasonable as to suggest thal
such was not the purpose of the legislature, a reasonable meaning
should be adopted if this can be found by a fair construction of the
language used.57 An example of where a reasonable meaning was ap-
plied may be found in Wolf v. Smith,58 where the court held that re-
quiring mine owners to keep at the mine bandages, oil, stretchers, and
blankets for use of injured employees is within the police power, and
does not infringe upon the constitutional rights of the owners.
The police power cannot be used as a cloak for the invasion of per-
sonal rights or private property, nor can it be used for the exclusive
benefit of certain individuals or classes. As observed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, "A police regulation, correctly speaking, is no more
legitimate than a law in any other field if it in fact violates any prin-
ciple entrenched in the Constitution. ' 59 As heretofore suggested, such
violation must be clear and substantial, as was found in the case of
Columbus Toney v. State. 0 There the validity of a statute containing
these words was in dispute: "That any person who has contracted in
writing to labor for, or serve, another for any given time * * * and
who before the expiration of such contract and without the consent
of the other party, and without sufficient excuse, to be adjudged by
the court, shall leave such other party * * * and who shall also make
a second contract, either parol or written, of a similar nature or char-
acter * * * with a different person, without first giving notice to such
person of the existence of the said contract, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor," and on conviction be punished by fine and imprisonment.
Clearly, this was a violation of the "life, liberty, and property" guar-
54 Westport v. Mulholland, 159 Mo. 86.
55 Coannwnwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375.
56 Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 W. L. 358
57 State ex rel. McGrael v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1 ; 128 N. IV. 1068.
58 149 Ala. 457.
59 State v. Redmion, 134 Wis. 89; 114 N. W. 137.
60 141 Ala. 120.
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antees of the federal constitution. So, there are many decisions holding
that the use of trading stamps cannot be forbidden by the legislature
because it clearly comes in conflict with the fourteenth amendment of
the Constitution.61 Thus where a law is made invalid because of some
constitutional provision, it is unnecessary to consider the question of
its reasonableness.
According to the following language it would seem that the ques-
tion of reasonableness necessarily includes a consideration of constitu-
tional restrictions: "It were better to always say that the police power
extends to and permits legislation regulating, reasonably, matters ap-
pertaining to the public welfare, since anything beyond that must
necessarily fall at the threshold of some constitutional defense." 62 But
since a statute or ordinance may satisfy the criterion of reasonable-
ness and still be invalidated because of some constituitonal prohibition,
it is best, wherever possible, to keep the matter of reasonableness
separate and distinct from constitutional considerations. It is mislead-
ing to cite cases holding laws invalid as unreasonable extensions of
the police power where the real basis for the decisions was that the
law is in violation of some constitutional guarantee. The question of
reasonableness need not be introduced where a law is clearly violative
of some constitutional restriction. The danger of speaking of both the
unreasonableness of the law and its infringement upon some constitu-
tional limitation is that it is not clear whether the unreasonableness
is found as a matter of fact or because it is violative of the Consti-
tuion. It is not certain, too, what weight is given to each reason, a
matter which may be of considerable importance in subsequent cases
in which that particular decision is referred to.
V. PRESUMPTION OF REASONABLENESS
There are other aspects of the doctrine of reasonableness as it is
applied to the police power. It has been held that the good intentions
of the legislature do not determine the validity of a statute. 63 The rea-
sonableness of a police regulation therefore is not wholly of legislative
concern. Among the questions which then suggest themselves are:
How far may courts go in determining whether a police regulation is
reasonable or unreasonable? Do personal convictions on the part of
the court that the statute is unreasonable justify it in holding the law
61 Winston v. Beeson, 135 N. C. 271;
Ex Parte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763;
State v. Dodge, 76 Vt. 197;
People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389.62 State v. Red-mont, 134 Wis. 89; 114 N. W. 137.
63 Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193; 116 N. W. 885.
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invalid? Does the mere fact that some property or personal right is
affected warrant the court in invalidating the law?
This matter of construing the reasonableness of a statute where
doubt exists is not free from difficulty and has received consideration
in different ways. It is frequently stated that the mere fact that per-
sonal or property rights are affected will not prevent a law from being
held valid. "The possession and enjoyment by the individual of all
his rights, even that of liberty itself, are subject to such reasonable
regulations and restraints as are essential to the preservation of the
health, safety, and welfare of the community." 64 The legislature has a
reasonable discretion as to the necessity and manner of the application
of the police power to particular conditions. Hence the court should
be willing to give a liberal construction to statutes designed for the
public welfare, which the court apparently failed to do in the case of
People ex rel. Duryea v. W4ilbur.65 There a law was in dispute which
provided that "no public dancing academy shall be conducted nor shall
dancing be taught or permitted in any public dancing academy unless
it shall be licensed, pursuant to this act and the license be in force and
not suspended." A violation of the act was made a misdemeanor. By
a four to three decision, the law was held an improper exercise of the
police power. This observation of the dissenting judges is significant:
"The wisdom of such legislaiton is no concern of the courts. The con-
crete question is, may the legislature take proper precautions to see
that public places, or places to which the public are invited, are safe,
sanitary, and decent ?"
In construing the element of reasonableness, the legislative discre-
tion should not be interfered with merely because it appears that no
actual harm by the object sought to be remedied has been shown.66
The enactment may be preventive, instead of remedial.67 In Durham
v. Eno Cotton Mills,68 it was held that it was not an infringement of
the rights of a riparian owner for the legislature to prevent the pollu-
tion of a river from which a public water supply is taken, although no
actual injury to the public health or comfort is shown. Similarly, in
State v. Schlenker,69 a statute was pronounced a proper exercise of
the police power which prohibited the addition of water or any other
substance to milk that is sold, even though the regulation extends to
cases where the addition does no harm and defrauds no one.
How the court may take opposite views in construing a doubtful
64 State v. Morse, 84 Vt. 387.
65 198 N. Y. 1.
66 Dunham v. New Britain, 55 Conn. 378
67 State v. Wheeler, 44 N. J. L. 88.
6 141 N. C. 615
69 112 Iowa 642.
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question of reasonableness may be illustrated by the following two
cases. In Wygant v. McLauchlan,7" an ordinance prohibiting the in-
ternment of human bodies in a sparsely settled locality, although with-
in the corporate limits was held invalid, the court being of the opinion
that the burials were not calculated to impair the public health. A
different position, however, is taken in Bryan v. Birmingham,71 which
is more observant of the functions of the court and more in accord
with the better views on this subject. There it was said that the pre-
sumption is that such an ordinance is reasonable and was enacted as a
sanitary measure for the protection of the health of the city or cer-
tain parts thereof, and it is incumbent upon a person attacking its
validity to show the contrary.
This subject may well be summarized by the observations of two
different courts. "If there is a reasonable doubt as to the connection
and adaptation, the advisability must be held by the court to have been
with the lawmaking body. The court must be able to see clearly that
the law was not so connected before holding it void for that reason."" 2
The court cannot set the law aside because it "may think itself more
sagacious than the legislature, and can therefore see more clearly that
the law will retard rather than promote progress and prosperity, and
will be a detriment to the common good when actually applied to
human affairs amid the conditions of the future."7 3
And to use the language of the court in Mugler v. Kansas7 4 which
was referring to police regulations enacted by the legislature: "Every
reasonable presumption is made in favor of their validity and every
intendment is indulged to sustain them, and the burden is on him who
asserts their illegality." Hence there is a presumption in favor of the
reasonableness of the legislative action. In other words, the legislative
act should clearly appear to be unreasonable before it is declared
invalid.75
VI. REASONABLENESS A QUESTION OF FACT
Another aspect of the doctrine of reasonableness is that what is a
reasonable regulation is purely aquestion of fact. This is an addition-
al reason why the matter of reasonableness should be considered inde-
pendent of the question whether the regulation is barred by constitu-
tional provisions, though whether the act is reasonable or not might
be an indispensable aid in deciding its constitutional status. The ques-
70 39 Ore. 429.
71154 Ala. 447
7 2 Holden v. Hardy, 14 Utah 71
73 Ibid.
74 123 U. S. 623
75 State v. Holcomb, 68 Iowa 107
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tion being essentially one of fact, it would seem that the jury would
be the sole judge of the reasonableness of a statute or ordinance. Such,
in fact, was the attitude of the court in an early Wisconsin case76 in-
volving an ordinance for the protection of a lake shore. The court
said, "It is impossible for the court to determine whether or not the
ordinance is reasonable and proper, in view of the object sought to be
accomplished, without some evidence upon the subject; and we cannot
see that it is a violation of any principle to submit these questions of
fact to a jury as in other cases." That view, however, was not adopted
in a later Wisconsin case, 77 in which this language is used by the court:
"Whether, in any case where the facts are undisputed, a city council
has exceeded its power by the enactment of an unreasonable ordinance,
is purely a judicial question, to be considered substantially the same
as that of whether the legislature has exceeded its constitutional au-
thority, reasonable doubts being resolved in favor of municipal
powers." It is clear from the authorities that the settled law today is
that the reasonableness of an ordinance is a question for the court.78
The rule that reasonableness is a matter for judicial determination
is not, however, extended to mean that the question must in all cases
be determined without the help of the jury. Some authorities hold
that where the reasonableness of the ordinance depends upon extrinsic
facts which are in dispute, the aid of the jury must be sought.7 9 So
then, in dealing with this question of reasonableness, the court is deal-
ing with a question of fact. Illustrations of cases where the validity
of statutes depended on questions of fact may be fouund in cases in-
volving the efficacy of vaccination,80 the regulation of hours of em-
ployment,8 1 the fixing of minimum wages for women and children,8 2
the regulation of speed of trains,8 3 and the fixing of standards of pur-
ity of milk and cream.84 Since the subjects with which the state may
and does deal are almost infinite, the courts are confronted with the
task of dealing with a countless number of different sets of facts.
What is a reasonable regulation must therefore vary with the circum-
76 Clason v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316.
77 Stafford v. Chippewa Valley E. R. Co. 110 Wis. 33178 Lusk v. Dora, 224 Fed. 650;
Wice v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. 193 Il1. 351;
Laulson v.Connolly, 15 Mich. 375.
79 State v. Boardman, 93 Me. 73;
Small v. Edenton, 146 N. C. 527;
People v. Detroit United R. Co. 134 Mich. 682
80Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U. S. 11.
81 Bunting v. State of Oregon, 243 U. S. 426.
82 Adkins v. Children's Hosp. 261 U. S. 525.
83 Lisk v. Dora, 224 Fed. 650.
84 City of St. Louis v. Liessing, 190 Mo. 464.
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stances . 5 It is very seldom, however, that the circumstances are exact-
ly alike; so that it is extremely dangerous to rely upon the ruling of
the court on the reasonableness of an act which on the face of it
appears to be very similar to a statute before the court for considera-
tion. The previously beaten paths of judicial opinion on the question
of reasonableness contain few accurate guideposts to new fields sought
to be explored by judicial review. Therefore, old cases and old laws
dealing with police regulations are of little help except as they serve
to guide the court, and insofar as they expound general principles
applicable to special circumstances.8 6 In its final analysis, the deter-
mination of the question must depend on the particular conditions, as
is also suggested in the case of State v. Feigold,1 "In drawing the line
which separates the field of arbitrary interference with protected rights
of property and freedom in personal action, from that of protective
legislation in behalf of public safety, each case must fall on one or
the other side in accordance with its particular circumstances."
Numerous cases have drawn attention to the fact that a business
which is lawful to-day may in the future, because of changed condi-
tions, become a menace to society."' It is therefore safe to submit that
it is unwise in many instances to cite old decisions on present day
police regulations of a similar texture as those passed on by previous
courts, because matters which may at that time have been regarded
as harmless may to-day be regarded as inimical to the general welfare.
It is even more true to-day than it was in the year 1897 that "the
tendency of modern development is in the direction of greater, rather
than more restricted, use of police power; and necessarily so, in order
to meet the new dangers and increase the old dangers constantly oc-
curring as natural incidents of advancing civilization."8 9 Precedent,
therefore, is not a safe guide. As economic and social conditions
change, judicial determinations founded on those conditions must
change.
The reasoning of a court in this field of the law may serve as a
poor guide to a proper determination of the validity of the statute.
The underlying questions of fact which determine the status of the
legislative enactment are matters upon which a legislative body may
feel justified in possessing an opinion which it is unwilling to ex-
change for that of a judge, especially when the judge bases his finding,
85 State v. Morse, 84 Vt. 387.
86 Wrights v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330
87 State v. Feigold, 77 Conn. 326.
8 8 Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Part, 97 U. S. 659;
New Orleans Gas Co. v. La. Light Co. 115 U. S. 650; "
Dobbins v. Los Anugeles, 195 U. S. 223.
89 Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 97 Wis. 422.
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not on evidence, but on general information which most likely is
weaker than that which served as a foundation for legislative action.
Thus, it is easy to understand how a lay public would question the
determination of a court finding, without taking and considering evi-
dence, that a law enacted by presumably intelligent persons limiting
the hours that people may work in bakeshops has no substantial rela-
tion to the promotion of health (Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45).
It is submitted that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a law
passed under the police power may properly be separated from a con-
sideration of judicial precedent. A more important consideration is
whether the police regulation is fairly appropriate to its purpose under
all of the existing circumstances and whether it is a bona fide exercise
of the judgment of the legislative department of government.
